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Introduction
The likely extension of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has triggered a lively debate on the organization of monetary policy in the euro area. Following a suggestion by the European Central Bank (ECB), current EMU member governments have agreed on a plan to reform the ECB's organizational structure with a view to (i) better match the economic and political weights of member countries in the ECB Council and (ii) limit the overall size of the Council. 1 While there is variation in detail, it is probably fair to say that most academic papers discussing the merits of the reform (or its necessity) agree that limiting the overall size of the ECB Council is a crucial step to ensure e¢ ciency in monetary policymaking in the euro area. 2 Already today the ECB Council is exceptionally large in terms of members and-even after the reform-euro area enlargement might leave the ECB with "too many [members] to decide on where to go to dinner,"as Baldwin (2001) remarked.
There is less agreement, however, on whether-or to what degree-correcting the existing lack of correlation between the member countries'economic size and their voting power is sound policy. The current ECB structure, by following the "one country, one vote" principle, gives economically smaller countries a disproportional large vote. EMU enlargement is likely to amplify this problem, even with ECB reform. Most (if not all) prospective new members are small enough to be over-represented even after the reform; they also show stark di¤erences in economic development compared to current members (de Haan et al. 2004 ).
The over-representation of smaller member states could introduce a bias into the ECB's decision-making. The Maastricht treaty would have the ECB stabilize in ‡ation within the euro area using the Harmonized Consumption Price Index. 3 This encourages the ECB to take a European perspective by evaluating the potential impact of national economic developments on euro area in ‡ation based on the respective relative economic size of a member country. If national central bank governors put at least some weight on national economic developments, their over-representation could distort this perspective by directing monetary policy toward national issues.
So does the plan for ECB reform fall short? The answer is far from clear. While reducing the degree of over-representation will ensure that the decision-making process within the ECB Council will be more likely to resemble the perspective of a benevolent European social planner, there are a number of arguments that caution against a too ambitious reform. For instance, Gros and Hefeker (2002) and Benigno (2004) point out that over-and under-representation of member countries in the planner's target function or, equivalently, in the distribution of voting rights within the actual ECB Council, could be optimal if transmission mechanisms di¤er. How important these di¤erences might be is, however, mostly an empirical question. 4 Another argument is made by Casella (1992) , who points out that over-representation could be a necessary condition for smaller countries to join a currency union.
The present paper adds central bank independence as a potentially crucial argument to this debate. 5 We focus on the need for federal central banks such as the ECB to strive for both political independence from, and fair representation of, member states on their policymaking bodies. We show that the interplay between two opposing forces-(i) the wish to reduce the impact of national preference shocks on union-wide policymaking, and (ii) the attempt to minimize misrepresentation of any one country's relative economic size so as to avoid over-or under-reactions to national economic shocks-determines the optimal representation of national interest on the Council. Calibrating Council representation to moderate the impact of preference shocks helps to 3 Euro area in ‡ation is computed by Eurostat using a weighted average of (harmonized) current euro area member in ‡ation rates, where the weights are based on relative expenditure on …nal private domestic consumption. The distribution of relative consumption very closely mirrors that of relative GDP. 4 Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2002) present evidence that suggests that transmission mechanisms have become fairly similar among current EMU members already during the 1990s. 5 Advantages of the "one country, one vote"principle based on considerations of political economy are also discussed in Berger (2002) and Berger et al. (2004) .
insulate common monetary policy from unwanted volatility when national targets might deviate from the common policy goal. Matching Council representation and economic weight, on the other hand, ensures that actual monetary policy stabilizes national economic shocks in line with the union ideal.
Optimal representation will, as a rule, weigh both arguments, re ‡ecting economic size as well as the stochastic properties of economic and preference shocks. As a consequence, whether a country will be optimally over-or under-represented compared to its relative economic size depends on all these determinants. While one might expect that most small countries would be over-represented and most large countries would be under-represented (as is the case in the ECB today), this does not always hold true. For instance, it might be optimal to over-represent a large country if its policy preferences are very stable relative to other union members.
In what follows, Section 2 will brie ‡y review recent related literature. Section 3 describes the model, the …rst-best benchmark policy, and derives the conditions for optimal representation of national interests within a currency union in the presence of economic and preference shocks. Section 4 allows for dependencies between shocks and hints at the impact of continued integration in the economic and preference domain on optimal representation. Section 5 provides a robustness check by allowing for alternative sources of national preference shocks. Section 6 attempts to put everything into perspective by comparing the degree of over-and under-representation relative to economic size for the ECB, the US Federal Reserve, and the German Bundesbank. In addition, determinants of optimal representation identi…ed by the theoretical model are compared with actual misrepresentation within the ECB. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions.
Relation to Recent Literature
Our contribution is related to three intertwined strands in the literature on central bank design. One, including von Hagen and Süppel (1994) and Lohmann (1997 Lohmann ( , 1998 , asks whether a central bank with a centralized or a decentralized structure is better suited to cope with partisan policy making at the national level. The argument is involved, but in general strong national representation in the joint central bank Council often leads to ine¢ ciencies at the union level. For instance, in the Lohmann (1997) model, a more decentralized central bank organization increases the frequency at which the Council's median voter (and, thus, central bank policy) changes, resulting in unwanted volatility in monetary policy.
This contrasts with a somewhat more recent body of papers discussing the e¢ ciency of alternative decision-making structures (see Gerling et al. (2003) for a survey). Gerlach-Kristen (2002), for instance, argues that committees with multiple members might be better suited than single individuals to process information, fostering e¢ cient decision-making-a theoretical result supported by experimental evidence produced by Blinder and Morgan (2002). 6 Since much of the information that federal central banks are processing is regional, this can be taken to suggest that regional or national representation in the Council has advantages (Maier et al. 2003) . 7 Thus, full centralization would not be optimal.
A third group of papers takes the in ‡uence of national interest on central bank Council policies as given-either because full centralization might not be optimal or because national representation is too deeply ingrained into the political setup of the currency union to be abandoned any time soon. The question is then how to deal with shocks to national preferences within a federal central bank system. The best-known contributions addressing this question include Waller and Walsh (1996) , who suggest long and overlapping contracts for Council members as a device to moderate the impact of national preference shocks (see also Lindner 2000) , an idea already re ‡ected in the actual term structure of ECB Council members.
Other recent proposals remain largely theoretical to date. The …rst such proposal would institute ‡exible majority rules for Council decisions (Gersbach and Pachl 2004). These rules would attempt to moderate demands for policy changes based on idiosyncratic national economic shocks by raising the majority requirements in line with the size of the desired interest rate change. A second proposal, from Heisenberg (2003) , argues that increasing the transparency of Council decision-making would diminish national in ‡uences on policies, helping to constrain the problem of national preference shocks at its source. Finally, Bullard and Waller (2004) discuss the advantages of alternative decision-making arrangements, including simple majority voting, bargaining, and a supermajority design, in a general equilibrium framework.
The present paper adds to this small but growing literature. As we will argue below, optimizing over-or under-representation of national representatives on the federal central bank Council compared to the relative economic size of their respective countries is another tool that can be used to moderate the impact of national preference shocks on the common monetary policy.
Whether the observed misrepresentation of economic size in the ECB Council can be reconciled with the theoretical argument is, of course, another, ultimately empirical, question. We shall revisit this issue toward the end of the paper.
The Model

The Economy and the First-Best Policy
The output gap in each member country of the currency union i, de…ned as the percentage deviation of the actual output level from the level of natural output y n i , is given by a standard Lucas supply function
In what follows, we will assume that decision-makers are well aware of the limits the Lucas function puts on real activity in the long run. In ‡ation, , is assumed to be similar across the currency union, that is, = i = 6 =i , and under the full control of the common central bank. In ‡ation expectations, denoted by e , are set rationally, so that e = E . The last term in equation (1), i , is a country-speci…c economic shock with zero mean and known (positive) variance.
A reasonable assumption-one that seems to be broadly in line with the spirit of the Maastricht treaty in the example of the ECB or the policy targets pursued by the US Federal Reserve-is that the …rst-best policy minimizes a standard quadratic loss function based on the deviations of in ‡ation and the aggregate output gap, y, from their commonly (currency union-wide) agreed target levels:
The term > 0 is an exogenous in ‡ation target, say 2 percent, and is a coe¢ cient measuring the relative weight attached to output stabilization. We assume that the latter ful…lls 0 < < 1. The target level for the aggregate output gap has been set to zero, ensuring that the …rst-best policy does not su¤er from a time inconsistency problem. The aggregate output gap is the weighted sum of the respective national output gaps, that is, y = X i y i , where we can de…ne the economic weights of each country as the expected share in aggregate union output: i y
or, in the two-country case,
where and (1 ) denote the relative economic weight of country 1 and country 2, respectively. In what follows, we will focus on the two-country case for simplicity.
The social planner sets in ‡ation by minimizing (2), taking into account (1), yielding the benchmark reaction function
Under rational expectations, equilibrium in ‡ation in the …rst-best will be
which, using (1), implies actual output in the two member countries will be
Thus, the expected welfare (loss) under a …rst-best policy is
where ' 1 ; 2 marks the coe¢ cient of correlation (and ' 1 ; 2 1 2 the covariance) between economic shocks in countries 1 and 2. The covariance term appears in EL because, while the central bank "leans against the wind" with its stabilization policy, it never fully compensates economic shocks in either country as long as the relative weight of the real term in the underlying loss function L is not in…nitely high.
Actual Decision-Making
The purely union-wide perspective employed to derive the benchmark solution might not be a good description of actual decision-making in a federal central bank. While, for instance, the ECB (1999, p. 55) rightfully stresses that "members of the [Council] do not act as national representatives, but in a fully independent personal capacity,"there is reason to assume that national economic considerations play at least some role in the voting behavior of governors in the Council. 8 This assumption is supported by evidence of national (or regional) in ‡uences in other federal central bank systems. Berger and de Haan (2002) show that regional di¤erences in growth and in ‡ation in ‡uenced voting behavior in the pre-1999 Bundesbank Council; Meade and Sheets (2002) …nd that Federal Reserve FOMC members do take into account developments in regional unemployment when deciding monetary policy; and Heinemann and Huefner (2004) and Meade and Sheets (2002) argue that there might even be indications of regional voting behavior in actual ECB policy.
A simple, yet plausible, description of actual decision-making within the common central bank is a weighted voting approach or a form of Nashbargaining in which voting weights are the fall-back positions. 9 In this case, decisions will be based on a loss function of the form
where i denotes the political weight of country i's representative or governor in the Council, with P i = 1. In other words, the loss function underlying actual central bank decisions is seen as a weighted sum of the individual loss functions of the member countries, L i , where the political weights can di¤er from the economic weights, that is, i R i .
Before moving on, note that the description of actual decision-making in the currency union's central bank Council ignores the role of a Board. In the current ECB, the Board casts 6 out of 18 votes in the Council; in the US Federal Reserves'FOMC the Board holds 7 out of 12 votes. Not taking into account the Board can be justi…ed by the notion that the Board is likely to target a loss function similar to the social planner's described in (2) . In the case of the ECB, for instance, the EU Treaty speci…es that the Board is appointed by "common accord of the governments of the member states at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation from the Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB" (EU 1997, Article 112 2. (b)). Arguably, this political process, which is highly centralized at the European level, tends to select Board members with a euro area-wide peespective. With the Board following a …rst best or Maastricht policy, however, analysis of possible deviations of ECB behavior from the Maastricht norm should focus (without loss of generality) on the behavior of national representatives. 10 But how will national central bank governors act in the Council? As already discussed, we assume that they base their decisions on a loss function thought to measure country i 0 s welfare:
where i (to which we will return in a moment) is the target level for in ‡ation. This speci…cation resembles that of the social planner with respect to the absence of an in ‡ationary bias. As in (2), the loss function of country i includes a real target compatible with the level of natural output in country i, and we assume that the relative weight of the real argument in (4), , is the same as in the …rst-best scenario.
There is, however, a di¤erence with respect to the in ‡ation bliss point. The national in ‡ation target is de…ned as
that is, country i's in ‡ation target might deviate from the common target, , by a preference shock " i with zero mean and known variance 2 " i . Preference shocks can occur for various reasons, but the most natural explanation ties them to changing (partisan) government preferences concerning in ‡ation. For instance, Hibbs (1977) and Alesina (1987) argue that policymakers-and thus the governments selecting the national governors in the currency union's central bank Council-have di¤erent objective functions, including (but not necessarily restricted to) the in ‡ation target. As a consequence, shocks to the composition of government can lead to unexpected changes in national preferences concerning in ‡ation. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) discuss empirical evidence to support this view. A related theory, put forth by Bullard and Waller (2004) , argues that changing preferences concerning in ‡ation might re ‡ect random changes in the political dominance of agents loosing (savers, for instance) and gaining (such as borrowers and wage earners) from high in ‡ation. This could in ‡uence the selection of national central bank governors for the common Council. 11 An alternative, non political-economic, approach would interpret the shocks, " i , as country-speci…c deviations from the broader trend of structural in ‡a-tion (along the lines of Balassa-Samuelson). 12 While targeted in ‡ation is a plausible explanation for the discord between di¤erent national Council members, it is not, of course, the only possible channel through which national preference shocks could in ‡uence common monetary policy. In particular, there could be partisan shocks to the preferred output gap or to the relative weight of the real argument in (4). However, allowing the output target instead of the in ‡ation target to ‡uctuate around zero at the national level has little impact on the analysis. The same holds, broadly speaking, for preference shocks to . We shall return to this issue further below.
To compute actual central bank policy in the two-country case, we substitute (4) into (3) to get
Minimizing (6) with regard to in ‡ation while taking into account (1) yields the reaction function
which, under rational expectations, implies the following actual equilibrium values for in ‡ation and output:
11 A related interpretation would be to assume that preference shocks re ‡ect exogenous changes in …scal fortitude, where, for example, governments with unexpectedly high de…cits will adjust their in ‡ation preferences upward. 12 It has been argued, for instance, that the ECB's in ‡ation target of (less then) 2 percent does not adequately re ‡ect the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect, especially for the EU accession countries still on a real convergence path to the EMU core . In this case equation (5) should be seen as a special case of the more general form i = + i +" i , with the (somewhat unrealistic) assumption that the contribution of trend structural in ‡ation to the national in ‡ation target, i , will be zero across countries. Note, however, that allowing i > 0, while introducing an additional dimension in the discussion of optimal representation, would not alter the thrust of the results of the analysis.
Optimal Representation
Substituting A ; y 1 A , and y 2 A in (2) and taking expectations, we can compute the expected welfare loss associated with the actual monetary policy, EL ( A ; y 1 A ; y 2 A ) (see Appendix 1). The optimal representation of country 1, , is simply the value of that minimizes the di¤erence between EL ( A ; y 1 A ; y 2 A ) and expected welfare under the …rst-best policy, that is
Country 2's optimal weight is, equivalently, 1 . Optimal representation will depend not only on the weight of the real argument in the loss function, , and the economic weight, , but also on both countries'economic and preference shocks and their possible interaction terms (see Appendix 1) .
In the next Section we will take a closer look at what de…nes optimal representation, with a focus on its relation to a country's economic weight.
To facilitate the analysis, we will start with the assumption that all shocks are independent. Analysis in subsequent Sections will allow for correlated shocks across and within countries.
The Baseline Case with Independent Shocks
Assuming that ' " 1 ;" 2 = ' 1 ; 2 = ' " i ; i = ' " i ; 6 =i = 0 for i = 1; 2, the optimal weight for country 1 becomes
which obviously satis…es 0 < < 1 because < 1 and
Over-and under-representation
Equation (8) has a straightforward implication for the relation between economic size and a country's optimal voting weight. In particular, we …nd that R ,
Broadly speaking, equation (9) states that over-representation in the Council in relation to a country's economic size is more likely to be optimal for smaller countries with relatively stable preferences. Under-representation, on the other hand, is more likely to be optimal for larger countries with rel-atively volatile preferences. This becomes even clearer if we rewrite (9) to highlight the tension between economic size and relative preference stability:
Obviously, over-representation is optimal if a country's share in the currency union's GDP is lower than a critical threshold value, P , measuring the other country's relative contribution to overall preference volatility. Vice versa, under-representation is optimal when a country is large relative to the other currency union member's contribution to preference volatility. The threshold value P has an interesting interpretation. Note that according to (8) and (10), ! P as
! 0, that is, P can be interpreted as the optimal political voting weight that results purely from trading o¤ di¤erences in the volatility of preferences between countries in the absence of economic shocks.
Equivalently, in the absence of preference shocks, the optimal political weight, , converges with a country's relative economic weight, , which, according to equation (2), is the weight it should receive under the …rst-best scenario:
! as
! 0. This suggests the following observation.
Remark 1
In general, optimal representation balances two opposing forces: the wish to reduce the impact of preference shocks on monetary policy (by bringing as close as possible to P ), and the attempt to limit misrepresentation of a country's relative economic size to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to national economic shocks (by keeping as closely as possible to ).
As a consequence, a country's optimal representation in the Council, , will always be in an interval de…ned by on the one hand and P on the other. Thus, whether a country will be over-or under-represented depends on the relative size of the country and the characteristics of both countries' preference shocks. Figure 1 illustrates both scenarios. Intuitively, we would expect small countries to be over-represented and large countries to be under-represented, but this is not necessarily the case. However, the intuitive scenario is the outcome if preferences are similar across the currency union: 13 Remark 2 If preference shocks were su¢ ciently similar, over-representation would always be optimal for small countries and under-representation would always be optimal for large countries.
On the other hand, if di¤erences in preference shocks are stark, there is room for a counterintuitive result:
Remark 3 Under-representation of a small country can be optimal if its in‡ation preferences are relatively volatile. By the same token, over-representation of a large country can be optimal if its in ‡ation preferences are stable in comparison. Size continues to be important, however, as these outcomes are less likely for very small or very large countries, respectively.
Thus, a large country with > 1=2 can only be over-represented if
. By the same logic, < requires
for a small country with < 1=2. The inequalities for over-and under-representation are both more likely to be ful…lled if j 1=2j ! 0. Figure 2 depicts the two scenarios discussed in the Remark. 13 Equation (9) reduces to R , Q (1 ) when
Obviously, similar outcomes can be found for asymmetrcial preference shocks as long as the di¤erences in preferences remain small compared to the di¤erences in economic size.
The above analysis suggests that the counterintuitive case of, for instance, a large country being over-represented, is most relevant when the actual overall di¤erence in country sizes within the union is small. In the extreme case of a monetary union of economic equals (i.e., when = (1 ) = 1=2), asymmetry in representation would always be optimal if there were asymmetries in preference shocks. As Figure 1 illustrates, in such a case countries with relatively more volatile in ‡ation preferences would receive less than =1/2 (and countries with relatively less volatile in ‡ation preferences would receive more than =1/2 ) of the voting rights in the joint central bank Council.
Finally, equation (9) sheds light on the "one country, one vote"principle featured so prominently in the debate on ECB reform. It shows that:
Remark 4 In the absence of economic shocks and if preference shocks are symmetrical, optimal representation in the Council follows the "one country, one vote" principle no matter the distribution of economic size.
While this Remark does not quite rule out "one country, one vote" as an optimal solution, it marks it as a rather special case. Equations (8) and (10) imply = 1 = P = 1=2 when economic shocks are absent (i.e. = 0) and when preference shocks are perfectly symmetrical (and uncorrelated)
Comparative Statics
How does optimal representation change with the characteristics of economic and preference shocks? As one would expect, inspection of (8) reveals a clearcut relation between representation and preference stability.
Remark 5 An increase in the volatility of preference shocks unconditionally reduces the optimal weight a country receives in the Council.
This should not come as a surprise. If optimal representation indeed balances the attempt to correctly mirror a country's relative economic size with the need to reduce the impact of national preference shocks on the Council, a country that su¤ers a decrease in preferences stability will see its optimal representation in the currency union's central bank being reduced. The …nding is independent of the initial degree of over-or under-representation.
In contrast, the impact of a marginal increase in economic volatility depends on a country's initial status.
Remark 6 An increase in economic volatility in a country reduces the gap between economic weight and optimal representation. Over-represented countries will see their optimal voting weight reduced, while under-represented countries will see their optimal voting right increased.
Proof. Taking the partial derivative of (8) and rearranging yields @ =@ 1 R 0 ,
, which, by (9) , implies the result.
For given country size, neglecting economic shocks in favor of moderating preference shocks becomes more expensive (in welfare terms) as economic volatility increases. As a consequence, a country which is burdened with a more volatile economy should see its optimal voting right increase. Figure 3 illustrates the result.
Over-Representation χ 0 
Optimal Representation With Correlated Shocks
Allowing for dependencies between economic and political shocks across countries and within a country is interesting on at least on two counts. First, introducing non-zero correlated shocks allows us to shed some light on the question of how closer integration of currency union member countries in ‡u-ences optimal representation. There is, for instance, the question of whether closer synchronization of business cycles will change the trade-o¤ underlying optimal representation in favor of economic size or preference stability. In addition, allowing for dependencies between shocks serves as a robustness check for the baseline results built on the assumption of zero correlations.
Correlated Economic Shocks
Economic shocks is one obvious area where there could be cross-country dependencies. As discussed above, even under the …rst-best scenario, the central bank would only "lean against the wind" and not fully compensate for an economic shock impacting all member countries of the currency union. This could mean that the "residual"country shocks will continue to in ‡uence all member countries in a correlated fashion. The correlation could be positive or negative. An example for a common shock with positive correlation would be an unanticipated change in oil prices. On the other hand, a surprise depreciation of the common currency, for instance, might help members that are net-exporters but hurt others that are net-importers, resulting in a negative correlation of economic shocks across countries.
The …rst insight from the model is that the baseline results on optimal representation hardly change when we allow for cross-country correlation of economic shocks. Allowing for ' 1 ; 2 6 = 0 but otherwise following the same steps as before, we …nd that the optimal weight for country 1 resembles (8), except for additional (additive) terms involving the cross-country covariance of economic shocks, ' 1 ; 2 1 2 . In fact, the condition determining whether a country will be optimally over-or under-represented compared to its economic weight is identical to (9) in the no-correlation case. This generalizes and strengthens the baseline …ndings. Appendix 2 lays out the formal results in some detail.
A second …nding can be summarized as follows:
Remark 7 As the currency union's economies become more similar in terms of their economic shocks, countries with relatively stable preferences are likely to see their optimal voting weight increase.
The rationale is-in line with the discussion of equation (10) earlierthat increased business cycle synchronization reduces the cost of moderating the impact of preference shocks on monetary policy, because a possible misrepresentation of economic size is now less likely to lead to a deviation of stabilization policy from its …rst-best benchmark.
Two comparative-static results lead to this conclusion (see Appendix 2). First, when business cycles are positively correlated across the currency union, and when country 1's economy is less volatile than country 2's to start with, then an increase in economic volatility in country 1, 1 , will make the two economies more similar. In this case, it becomes less costly to o¤set preference shocks by allowing voting rights to deviate from relative economic size. As a consequence, optimal representation requires that the country's optimal weight in monetary policy decisions should be based more on preference shock considerations, and the spread between economic and political weights in the currency union grows.
14 The second relevant result is that a higher coe¢ cient of correlation between economic shocks will lead to higher optimal representation for the country initially over-represented and vice versa. Thus, once again, as economic shocks become more similar, the optimal spread between economic and political weights in the currency union increases.
This analysis suggests that currency unions should optimally pay more attention to relative preference stability considerations as their joint economy "matures" and becomes increasingly more integrated. If integration implies an increasing likeness of economic shocks, preference stability considerations should eventually dominate the calculation of members'optimal Council representation. In somewhat more formal terms: we …nd that approaches the optimal weight in the absence of economic shocks, P , as the correlation between national economic shocks approaches positive unity and the di¤erence between the volatility of economic shocks reduces to zero. 15 
Correlated preference shocks
Next, we allow for correlation between preference shocks while assuming zero correlation between all other shocks. The idea is that surprise changes in in ‡ation preferences might well take the form of union-wide "mood swings" that simultaneously a¤ect all member countries and their representatives in the common central bank. Alternatively, one might speculate that preference changes are negatively correlated across countries.
While the optimal weight in this scenario once again resembles (8) in the case with independent shocks, allowing for ' " 1 ;" 2 6 = 0 in ‡uences the condition determining whether a country will be over-or under-represented compared to its economic size (see Appendix 3). In particular, if preference shocks are positively correlated, it might be optimal to over-represent (or underrepresent) member countries with very stable (or very unstable) preferences irrespective of their economic size. The intuition is that a positive correlation of preference shocks across countries reduces the chance that national preference shocks will neutralize each other within the Council. Increasing the voting weight of countries with very stable preference can be optimal to minimize the resulting unwanted volatility in joint monetary policy. In addition, we can make a statement that parallels the similarity result in the case with correlated economic shocks: 16 Remark 8 As currency union member countries become more similar in terms of their preference shocks, economically large countries are likely to see their optimal voting weight increase and small countries are likely to see their optimal voting weights decrease.
The rationale behind this rests on the implied change in the balance of forces driving optimal representation. In this case, greater likeness of preference shocks reduces the potential gains from moderating these shocks by letting optimal voting weights deviate from economic size, thereby allowing preference shocks to compensate each other in the Council. As a consequence, large countries (which are more likely to be under-represented when shocks become more similar) should see their voting weights being increased and small (probably over-represented) countries should see them reduced.
Two comparative-static results support this conclusion (see Appendix 3). First, a rise in the correlation of preference shocks will increase a country's optimal voting weight if it is large in economic terms and its preferences are relatively stable. Second, an increase in country 1's preference volatility that brings its volatility level closer to country 2's will lead to a decrease in its optimal representation. Since, in this case, country 1 was blessed with more stable preferences at the outset, it was also over-represented before the change. As a consequence, the decrease in optimal representation brings its voting weight closer to its economic weight.
The above analysis implies that increasing likeness of preference shocksarguably a possibility within an ever more integrated currency union such as the U.S. or the European Union-should prompt the currency union to better tailor Council voting weights to members'economic size. It is straightforward to show that approaches as the correlation between national preference shocks approaches positive unity, and the di¤erence between the volatility of these shocks reduces to zero. Note that this possible "integration e¤ect" runs counter to the implications of increasing likeness of economic shocks discussed in the previous Section.
Correlated Economic and Preference Shocks
If preference shocks are, at least in part, a consequence of changes in government, and if changes in government are in ‡uenced by economic conditions, preference and economic shocks might not be independent from each other. In fact, there is room for something akin to a political business cycle. For instance, one can imagine that voters elect a government that is more tolerant to in ‡ation when economic activity is in decline, giving rise to a negative correlation between economic and preference shocks.
As with cross-country correlations, allowing preference shocks to be correlated with economic shocks within country 1 (i.e. , ' " 1 ; 1 6 = 0) changes optimal representation and the conditions for over-or under-representations compared to the baseline (see Appendix 4)-albeit not fundamentally. Interestingly, however, under certain conditions a strong political business cycle in the sense just discussed might make it optimal to decrease a country's voting weight below its relative economic size.
Remark 9 A negative correlation between preference shocks and economic shocks (a "political business cycle") ampli…es country 1's policy demands in the Council after economic shocks-making optimal under-representation more likely.
The rationale behind this …nding is that a negative correlation of output and preference shocks in country 1 increases the cost of over-representing a country in the Council. To see this, note that, according to equation (7), the preferred in ‡ation rate of country 1 is:
Over-representation of country 1 would mean that, for instance, a negative shock to the output gap ( 1 < 0) would trigger a too expansionary monetary policy at the union level, as country 1's preferred policy reaction ( 1 =(1 + ) > 0) would receive greater in ‡uence on Council decisions than suggested by its economic weight. This policy request would be further ampli…ed if country 1 is, in addition, subject to an in ‡ation preference shock pointed in the opposite direction as the output shock (" 1 > 0 in this example), increasing the distance to the …rst-best policy.
The above analysis is reinforced by the comparative statics for optimal representation (see Appendix 4 for details). 18 As one would expect, the optimal voting weight increases if the correlation between preference and economic shocks rises in circumstances in which the country's in ‡ation preferences are relatively stable and economic volatility is high across the currency union. Moreover, a country will see its optimal representation in the Council increase if its economic shocks become more volatile and the correlation between economic and preference shocks is su¢ ciently positive and large. That is, unlike in the pervious scenarios, the impact of higher economic volatility does not depend on whether a country is initially over-or under-represented. As a consequence, the gap between economic weight and optimal representation might not be reduced. A related result is that a country might see its optimal voting weight increase after a marginal rise in preference volatility. This, too, is in strict contrast with all previous …ndings. The intuition is that the "blessings"hidden in a higher and positive correlation of preference and economic shocks depend on a certain balance between the two. For exceedingly volatile preferences, their potentially moderating impact becomes mute.
Relative-Weight Preference Shocks
The principle results of the baseline model with uncertain national in ‡ation preferences are robust with regard to alternate sources of preference uncertainty. In particular, optimal representation continues to depend not only on relative economic size but also on the relative characteristics of economic and preference shocks. As a consequence, over-representation of large and under-representation of small countries remain a theoretical possibility.
Following Beetsma and Jensen (1998), we allow for preference shocks regarding the weight on the relative real target. In this case the individual loss functions of member countries become
where " i 0;
and > 0 in line with the …rst-best policy. Again focusing on the two country case, actual central bank policy can be calculated based on the Lucas supply function (1) and the representation-weighted sum of national loss functions
Based on the resulting equilibrium values for in ‡ation and output, we can compute the expected welfare loss. Minimizing the latter with regard to country 1's voting weight in the Council, we …nd that optimal representation satis…es
where the subscript " "marks the relative-weight preference shock scenario. Note that 0 < < 1. Equation (12) reveals similarities and some di¤erences with the in ‡ation preference shock case depicted in (8) . Comparing and , one notes that the terms involving economic volatility alone are similar. As opposed to what we saw in (8), however, the volatility of preference shocks in (12) . This is due to the fact that-in a model without in ‡ationary bias-relative-weight preference shocks only impact actual policy if there is a shock to output. In the absence of economic shocks, that is if y i = 0, the Council will set in ‡ation equal to the in ‡ation target (which in this case is constant).
In general, however, optimal representation continues to depend on relative economic size as well as on the relative characteristics of economic and preference shocks, just as in the baseline model.
Re ‡ecting the similarities in optimal representation, the condition for over-and under-representation with relative-weight uncertainty resembles the condition in the baseline case and over-representation of large and underrepresentation of small countries remain a theoretical possibility. The condition for over-and under-representation becomes R ,
which, except for the weighting of preference volatility, is identical with (9) in the baseline model. As before, given economic volatility, over-representation is more likely to be optimal for small and politically relatively stable countries. If economic shocks were symmetrical, equations (9) and (13) would be identical. Rearranging, we …nd that the critical value indicating the maximum coun-try size for a country to be over-represented, P , is implied by
Similar to P in equation (10) in the case with in ‡ation preference shocks, P measures the other country's relative contribution to overall preference volatility. As before, optimal representation can be interpreted as balancing preference shock moderation (by bringing closer to preference-uncertainty based optimal weight P ) and minimizing misrepresentation of economic size (by letting approach the …rst-best economic weight ). As a consequence, Remarks 1-4 in the baseline case also apply to the case of uncertain relativeweight preferences.
One di¤erence between the baseline and the present model is the in ‡uence of economic volatility on optimal representation. While optimal representation continues to be decreasing in the volatility of preference shocks in the present model, an increase in economic volatility now unconditionally reduces a country's optimal weight in the Council.
When preference uncertainty shifts from the in ‡ation target to the relative weight, even under-represented countries will have their optimal representation reduced. The reason is that an increase in economic volatility ampli…es the unwanted impact of preference shocks on monetary policy, leading to a decrease in P . Because optimal representation weighs both and P , the reduction in P "pulls" downward. While the forces that helped create an increase in optimal representation in the baseline model are still present, the negative e¤ect stemming from higher preference-uncertainty always dominates (see Appendix 5).
Some Empirical Observations
How does the distribution of i and i look in the example of the ECB? Under the current "one country, one vote"rule, the relative voting rights of national governors are strictly symmetrical, that is, i = 1=n, if we disregard the votes allocated to the Board. As Figure 4 illustrates, for a hypothetical EMU with 24 members (assuming that the ten EU accession countries as well as Romania and Bulgaria, have joined the euro area), this will change if the ECB reform is implemented and EMU enlargement proceeds, giving way to a (somewhat) more asymmetric voting scheme, in which i will be adjusted to better re ‡ect economic size. To provide some perspective, it is interesting to relate the degree of misrepresentation in today's ECB, as well as in the hypothetical ECB with 24 members depicted in Figure 4 , to the example of other federal central banksnamely the US Federal Reserve System and the German Bundesbank before the advent of the euro. Table 1 shows two indicators of misrepresentation based on the sum of the squared deviation of the voting rights held by a country or region in the decision-making Council or committee and its GDP share.
Strikingly, the misrepresentation of economic size in the ECB Council is about an order of magnitude more severe than in the Fed or, after the post-uni…cation reform of 1992, the Bundesbank. This is true if the misrepresentation indicator ignores the role of the Board, if we look at an EMU Table 1 with 12 or 24 members, or if we look at the situation before or after the planned ECB reform. In other words, economic size plays a signi…cantly smaller role in the distribution of voting rights within the ECB than in other federal central banks.
Can the comparatively stark pattern of misrepresentation of size in the ECB be explained by some of the determinants of optimal representation identi…ed by the theoretical model? To answer this question, we need to …nd proxies for the latter-certainly not an easy feat. While it is straightforward to measure relative size (by GDP share, for instance), indicators of preference stability are less easily identi…ed. One plausible assumption is that frequent changes of government are indicative of (or a prerequisite for) changing preferences. Moreover, such changes might be more signi…cant when governments show a high degree of cohesion. Table 2 gives information on the degree of government cohesion, a measure of government change, and relative economic size for the existing 12 members of EMU. Table 3 does the same for the hypothetical EMU with 24 members.
Given the approximate nature of the indicators and, in the case of Table 3, the short time-span covered, any interpretation of the data should be taken with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, a cautious interpretation of Tables  2 and 3 suggests that not all over-and under-representation of national representatives on the ECB Council could be easily justi…ed. In only 5 out of 12 counties in Table 2 , and in only 10 out of 24 countries in Table 3 , do GDP share, change, and cohesion point in the same direction. Moreover, it would seem that actual over-or under-representation of very large and very small countries is least in line with the suggestions of the model.
Concluding Remarks
The question of optimal representation of regional interests within a federal central bank has received much attention recently. The likely extension of the euro area has highlighted problems-such as a possible mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in the decision-making committeewith the "one country, one vote principle"in a currency union such as EMU.
The present paper adds central bank independence as a potentially crucial argument to this discussion. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bank in which optimal voting weights re ‡ect two opposing forces: the wish to insulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and the attempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic shocks. Adjusting representation in the decision-making committee to moderate preference shocks 
in excess of (3) 
Consensus? Political Weight
in Excess of ( Table 1 for a detailed explanation of the variables.
insulates joint monetary policy from unwanted volatility when national or regional policy targets deviate from common goals. Basing representation on economic weight, on the other hand, helps to prevent national or regional economic shocks from undermining the common goal. Optimal representation weighs both arguments, re ‡ecting economic size as well as the stochastic properties of economic and preference shocks. An important theoretical result is that a perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and neither is the "once country, one vote principle". Consequently, whether a country should be over-or underrepresented compared to its relative economic size depends on a number of di¤erent forces, including relative size, the relative weight of the real target, and the stochastic properties of economic and preference shocks. Some might intuitively expect small countries to be over-represented and large countries to be under-represented. But there is room for a counter-intuitive result: for instance, it might be optimal to over-represent a large country if its policy preferences are very stable relative to other union members.
Taking a closer look at the possible interaction of economic and preference shocks, we …nd that continued integration in the form of better business cycle synchronization and more similar preferences can have opposing e¤ects on optimal representation. Increasing likeness of preference shocks gives an incentive to tailor committee voting weights closer to economic size. Increasing likeness of economic shocks has the opposite e¤ect: relative preference stability considerations gain in importance as economic shocks become more similar. Finally, allowing for political business cycle in the sense of a positive correlation between preference shocks and economic shocks within a country might help to moderate country 1's policy demands in the Council after economic shocks.
The basic results of optimal over-or under-representation are fairly robust with regard to alternative assumptions on shock correlations. Moreover, the principle …ndings seem to be independent of the source of preferences uncertainty. The baseline model assumes uncertain in ‡ation preferences, but optimal representation continues to follow similar determinants when preference shocks are tied, instead, to the relative weight of the real argument in the national welfare functions. As a consequence, for instance, over-representation of large and under-representation of small countries remains a possibility.
Empirically, there are indications that misrepresentation of member countries in the ECB Council might be extreme and not always optimal. A comparison of deviations of actual representation from relative economic size in the ECB Council with the US Federal Reserve's FOMC and the pre-euro Bundesbank Council reveals that misrepresentation of economic size in the ECB is about an order of magnitude more severe. The theoretical model suggest two possible explanations. First, preference homogeneity within the German and the US currency areas might be higher than in today's euro area or, somewhat less likely, business cycle synchronization could be better within the euro area. In both cases the model implies that optimal representation within the ECB Council (relative to the two other federal central banks) should focus more on preferences than on economic size. Alternatively, of course, representation within the ECB Council might not be optimal in the …rst place. Indeed, even though the empirical proxies used need to be treated with caution, the ECB pattern of misrepresentation of economic size is di¢ cult to explain with theoretically identi…ed determinants of optimal representation alone. This suggests further room for discussion, even after the ECB reform.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 (Expected welfare under actual policy)
Expected welfare under the actual policy is:
The optimal representation of country one is:
Appendix 2: The case with correlated economic shocks (' 1 ; 2 6 = 0)
The optimal weight for country 1 is
which is always within the permissible range 0 < < 1 (see below).
> 0, a su¢ cient condition for > 0 is that
Because, by de…nition, ' 1 ; 2 1, this condition always holds if
0-which is always ful…lled. The condition for < 1 is
Because 2 " 1 > 0 and < 1, a su¢ cient condition for the inequality to hold is that the last bracket on the RHS be positive or zero, that is,
. This is always ful…lled.
Conditions for R
As in the baseline model, it holds that
Proof. Going through the same movements as before, we get
where the last inequality is always ful…lled . To see this, reformulate as
. This inequality always holds as ' 1 ; 2 1 and
Comparative statics
Taking the derivative of (15) with regard to economic volatility, rearranging, and consulting equation (9) we …nd that
Also note that @ =@ 1 = 0 when economic shocks are symmetrical in the sense that 1 = 2 . In scenario (a), business cycles are unsynchronized across countries, and a further increase in economic volatility in country 1 is likely to drive the economies even more apart. To see this, note that ' 1 ; 2 < 1 = 2 implies either a negative correlation between economic shocks or, when the correlation is positive, that country 1's economy is more (or at least not signi…cantly less) volatile than country 2's. In this case, equation (16) demands that the weight of country 1 in the Council should be increasing if it was initially under-represented relative to its economic weight; and it should be decreasing if it was initially over-represented. This helps to reduce the spread between economic and political weights in the currency union.
The alternative scenario (b) depicts a currency union with positively correlated business cycles in which country 1's economy is less volatile than country 2's-thus, somewhat counterintuitively, the economies actually become more similar as 1 increases. 20 In this case, it becomes less costly to o¤set in ‡ation preference shocks by allowing voting rights to deviate from the proportional representation of economic size. As a consequence, equation (17) requires that the country's optimal weight in monetary policy decisions be based more on preference shock considerations. To be precise, country 1's optimal representation in the Council increases if it was initially overrepresented relative to its economic weight; and it decreases if it was initially under-represented. That is, the spread between economic and political weights in the currency union grows.
Taking the derivative of (15) with regard to the coe¢ cient of correlation, rearranging, and consulting equation (9) yields:
Finally, it is straightforward to show that higher preference volatility results in a reduction in optimal representation as in the no-correlation case.
Appendix 3: The case with correlated preference shocks (' " 1 ;" 2 6 = 0)
In this case the optimal weight for country 1 is
The ratio (18) has a positive denominator. 21 But the nominator might be either positive or negative depending on the coe¢ cient of correlation between preference shocks (' " 1 ;" 2 ), and the relative size of preference instability and economic volatility. In particular, > 0 requires
and the condition
secures that < 1. The RHS-terms in both inequalities re ‡ect, in turn, the volatility of preference shocks, country size, and the welfare costs of output volatility. The LHS of both conditions consists of the covariance of preference shocks. Thus, in general, an internal solution for optimal representation requires that the welfare costs induced by the variance of economic shocks be large compared to the variance of in ‡ation preferences. Note that a suf…cient condition for an internal solution for optimal representation is that national shocks to in ‡ation preference di¤er (only) moderately in terms of their volatility and correlation. To be more precise:
Conditions for R
We …nd that R , 21 The argument is the familar one: a su¢ cient condition for a positive denominator is ' "1;"2 2 "1 + 2 "2 =2 "1 "2 , which is ful…lled because ' "1;"2 1.
This implies that over-(under-)representation will always be optimal if a country's preferences are very stable (very volatile) in relative terms and preference shocks are su¢ ciently positively correlated across countries. Formally:
> ( " 1 < " 2^'" 1 ;" 2 > " 1 = " 2 ; < ( " 2 < " 1^'" 1 ;" 2 > " 2 = " 1 :
Proof. According to (19) , over-representation requires
' " 1 ;" 2 " 1 " 2 , which is always ful…lled for
, or, equivalently, " 1 = " 2 < ' " 1 ;" 2 < " 2 = " 1 . Since, by de…nition, ' " 1 ;" 2 1, for " 1 < " 2 this reduces to ' " 1 ;" 2 > " 1 = " 2 . Equivalently, under-representation requires ' " 1 ;" 2 > " 2 = " 1 if " 2 < " 1 .
Comparative statics
Starting from an interior solution, an increase in the volatility of preference shocks reduces the optimal weight a country holds in the Council. Proof. Taking the derivative of equation (18) with regard to " 1 , one …nds that @ @ " 1 < 0 ( ' " 1 ;" 2 min 
:
As shown above, if the RHS-inequality is binding, we also have 0 < < 1.
An increase in economic volatility suggests a higher optimal voting right in the Council, if the country was initially under-represented and vice versa. More formally:
Proof. Taking the derivative of (18) with regard to 1 leads to the condition
which by equation (19) implies the above. If the correlation between preference shocks across countries rises, a country is more likely to see its optimal voting weight increase, if its preferences are relatively stable and it is large in economic terms. To be precise:
Proof. Taking the derivative of (18) with regard to ' " 1 ;" 2 yields the above term, where the RHS of the last inequality is increasing in country 1's relative economic size, , making the case @ =@' " 1 ;" 2 > 0 more probable to hold. This, trivially, is also true for a higher 2 " 2 or a lower
Appendix 4: The case with correlated economic and preference shocks (' " 1 ; 1 6 = 0)
Assuming that all cross-country shocks are independent but allowing economic and shocks to in ‡ation preferences to be correlated within country 1 (i.e. , ' " 1 ; 1 6 = 0), we …nd that the optimal weight for country 1 becomes
While extreme values for cannot be excluded in general in this case, the optimal voting weight is likely to fall into the permissible range 0 < < 1 for a wide range of parameters (see below).
Conditions for
The denominator of (20) is positive. 22 Thus > 0 requires the nominator to be positive, too. Obviously, this is more likely to be the case if preference shocks and economic shocks in country 2 are volatile. As far as country 1 is concerned, inspection of (20) reveals that, because which is always ful…lled if the welfare costs associated with economic volatility exceed the volatility of preferences in country 1 or the correlation between preference and economic shocks in country 1 is non-positive, i.e. if ' " 1 ; 1 0. To ensure that < 1, we need that
which is likely to be ful…lled unless the "political-economic" covariance between preference and economic shocks within country 1, the LHS of the 22 The denominator is positive if inequality, takes on extreme values that dominate the RHS, which unambiguously increases in the sum of the variances of the economic shocks in countries 1 and 2 and the preference shock in country 1. Note that this inequality, too, will always be ful…lled for non-positive values of ' " 1 ; 1 .
We conclude that an interior solution with 0 < < 1 is more likely the smaller the coe¢ cient of correlation (with a negative correlation always implying an interior solution) and the larger the welfare costs of economic volatility in the currency union.
Conditions for R
We …nd: R ,
Comparative statics
Taking the derivative of optimal representation (20) with regard to preference volatility yields
Moreover, note that if preference shocks are symmetrical or more volatile than economic shocks in welfare terms, i.e. " 1 1 , the optimal voting weight will always decrease as the preferences become less stable. Proof. De…ne = ) 2 ' " 1 ; 1 " 1 1 so that = = . Then, taking the derivative of equation (20) with regard to " 1 , one …nds that
In an interior solution: 0 < < 1 and, thus, 0 < < . This leads to the su¢ cient condition noted above. Note that 0 < < 1 implies 2 " 1 =(2 ) 1 > 1 when 
